Safety Investigation Report 2018:3 Findings and Conclusion/3.1 Findings/3.1.2
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SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT
Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
This page contains an extract from the Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018 and Appendices released by The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, and dated 2 July 2018.
SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT
MH370 (9M-MRO)
3.1.2 Air Traffic Services Operations
- 1) Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Services
- a) KL ATSC operation was normal with no significant observation until 1720 UTC [0120 MYT].
- b) KL ACC controllers transferred MH370 to Ho Chi Minh ACC at 1719:26 UTC, 3 minutes before the original estimate time of the transfer of the control point.
- c) HCM ACC did not notify KL ACC when two-way communication was not established with MH370 within five minutes of the estimated time for the transfer of control point.
- d) KL ACC controllers relied solely on position information of the aircraft provided by MAS Flight Operations Despatch Centre rather than checking up with other ATC authorities.
- e) The Air Traffic controllers did not initiate, in a timely manner, the three standard emergency phases in accordance with the standard operating procedures.
- f) There is no record to suggest that the KL ACC controllers took any action to alert the RMAF Joint Air Traffic Control Centre (JATCC).
- g) There is no evidence to suggest that the Air Traffic controllers at KL ACC had kept continuous watch on the radar display.
- h) KL ACC controllers did not comply fully with established ATC procedures.
- 2) Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Services
- a) There were uncertainties on the position of MH370 by both KL ACC and HCM ACC.
- b) The command of the English language in the coordination process between KL ACC and HCM ACC needs improvement.
- c) HCM ACC did not notify KL ACC when two-way communication was not established with MH370 within five (5) minutes of the estimated time for the transfer of control point.
Comments and Notes