Flight MH370 Timeline/NIO-SIO: Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 09:15, 31 August 2026
After MH370 turned south toward the southern Indian Ocean the aircraft continued flying until running out of fuel.
What we know is limited to data from some satellite communications as shown in this Section
North Indian Ocean to Southern Indian Ocean
From 2:40 MYT to End of Flight Saturday 8 March 2014
(18:40 UTC Friday 7 March 2014 to End of Flight)
3. Other Satellite Communications
After the successful log-on which commenced at 0225:27 MYT there were a series of automated communications, and two unsuccessful telephone calls from Malaysia Airlines.
Because the SATCOM was logged-on, the ground station periodically communicated with it to check that it was still logged on. These automated transmissions should occur approximately every hour.
However, the two telephone calls using the satellite system had the effect of resetting the timer at the ground station, so the 'handshakes' initiated by the ground station were not one hour apart.
The Table below shows the sequence of handshakes and phone calls. The metadata associated with the transmissions for each 'handshake' enabled Investigators to calculate the distance of the aircraft from the satellite at the time of each event. This is shown as a series of concentric rings in the diagram below right. The Time on each ring is UTC.
Table 1.9B - SATCOM ‘Handshakes’
| SATCOM TRANSMISSIONS | TIME | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| UTC | MYT* | ||
| 1. | Aircraft departed KLIA | 1642:04 | 0042:04 |
| 2. | Last ACARS transmission | 1707:48 | 0107:48 |
| 3. | 1st handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft | 1825:27 | 0225:27 |
| 4. | Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call | 1839:52 | 0239:52 |
| 5. | 2nd handshake initiated by ground station | 1941:00 | 0341:00 |
| 6. | 3rd handshake initiated by ground station | 2041:02 | 0441:02 |
| 7. | 4th handshake initiated by ground station | 2141:24 | 0541:24 |
| 8. | 5th handshake initiated by ground station | 2241:19 | 0641:19 |
| 9. | Unanswered ground-to-air telephone call | 2313:58 | 0713:58 |
| 10. | 6th handshake initiated by ground station | 0010:58* | 0810:58 |
| 11. | 7th handshake - log-on initiated by the aircraft | 0019:29* | 0819:29 |
| 12. | Aircraft did not respond to ‘handshake’ from Satellite Earth Ground Station | 0115:56* | 0915:56 |
| *08 March 2014 | |||
Adapted from Safety Investigation Report SIR-2018 Table 1.9B - SATCOM ‘Handshakes’
Source: Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, 02 July 2018, Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018
Note: Table 1.9B, when published, showed times rounded to the nearest minute. The above version has been updated to include seconds, so that each time can be linked to the correct event in the Timeline. No other data has been changed. The two versions can be seen together here.
Figure 18: BTO ring solutions for 9M-MRO
Source: MH370 - Definition of Underwater Search Areas, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2014
ATSB-RPT-111
.
Note: Each yellow arrow points to a 'ring', using the time as a label. The arrow does not indicate the position of MH370 at that time.
5. A Possible Flight Path
There are many variables to consider when defining the time when MH370 turned south. Investigators have worked hard to refine their mathematical models so that they can predict more accurately where the flight ended.
Obviously, we do not know the exact time that a turn commenced. There have been many attempts to reconstruct a flight path using an early turn; a late turn; or some time in-between. Each solution must still place the aircraft on one of the seven arcs at the time of the relevant satellite communication.
An aircraft can also make different types of turn - gentle and level is normal for passenger flights; or steeply banked; maybe with some acceleration through the turn; or a change of altitude. There are many possibilities, including whether the turn was manually controlled or executed by the autopilot.
One of the valid flight paths is shown in the diagram opposite. This one was created by engineers from Inmarsat who did the original calculations with the values of Burst Timing Offset and Burst Frequency Offset. Without this innovative analysis of the metadata we would have absolutely no idea where MH370 went after flying beyond Malaysia's military radar coverage.
The flight path shown here is 'indicative' - it represents a likely end-of-flight path in a southerly direction with its' heading changing from 186° to 180° by the end of the flight. See The Search for MH370 (Inmarsat).
Note: Although MH370 was close to the northern tip of Sumatra, it likely crossed, or was close to, Indonesian airspace. But there is no radar data from Indonesia.
Figure 17. Example Flight Path.
Source: The Search for MH370, Chris Ashton, Alan Shuster Bruce, Gary Colledge and Mark Dickinson (Inmarsat), as published in The Journal of Navigation (2015)
The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground-to-Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.
The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground-to-Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.
Requested MH386, which was then in the HCM FIR, to try to establish contact with MH370 on emergency frequencies.
At 0300 MYT there was a changeover in the Controllers at KL ATCC.
At 0000 MYT (midnight and prior to the departure of MH370) the number of Controllers in the KL ATSC was scaled down by half to enable the Controllers to take a scheduled 3-hour break from duty. At 0300 MYT the first group of Controllers returned from their break and the second group started their break which would last until 0600 MYT.
Just before 3am, 30 minutes after being contacted by the Operations Centre, the Crisis Director for Malaysia Airlines, Fuad Sharuji declared a code red emergency.
Within an hour, members of the airline’s Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) had assembled at Kuala Lumpur airport, followed soon after by an emergency response working group, ‘go teams’, and a special assistance team.
KL ACC called Malaysia Airlines ODC and queried MAS for news on MH370.
The Technical Captain said: “Whatever we have here suggest that the aircraft had never leave Lumpur airspace because he has failed to call Ho Chi Minh” and suggested to KL ATSC to trace back the record, voice recording and time of the positive handover to Ho Chi Minh.
KL ACC replied: “I wake up my supervisor and ask him to check again ....".
Search and Rescue
Annex 12 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Search and Rescue requires that a rescue coordination centre (RCC) be established in each search and rescue region; and each rescue coordination centre is to be staffed 24 hours a day by trained personnel.
In addition to the processes and procedures covered by Annex 12, the operation of an RCC is guided by the three volumes of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR).
Activation of the Rescue Coordination Centre (Kuala Lumpur)
DETRESFA Message
Annex 12 defines three phases of an emergency:-
- Uncertainty phase. A situation wherein uncertainty exists as to the safety of an aircraft and its occupants.
- Alert phase. A situation wherein apprehension exists as to the safety of an aircraft and its occupants.
- Distress phase. A situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that an aircraft and its occupants are threatened by grave and imminent danger and require immediate assistance.
These phases are also referred to by abbreviations: INCERFA, ALERFA and DETRESFA.
By 5:30 am Saturday 8 March 2014 when the KL-ARCC was activated, Flight MH370 was clearly in the Distress Phase. Annex 12 Section 5 lists actions to be taken and the known details were communicated to various recipients in a DETRESFA Message.
Malaysia Airlines Operations used ACARS to upload flight plan information for MH371, which is the normal return flight from Beijing to Kuala Lumpur.
The intention of this upload may have been to assist MH370 to return to Kuala Lumpur. Unfortunately, the initiative was unsuccessful.
Malaysia Airlines Operations used ACARS to upload flight plan information for MH371, which is the normal return flight from Beijing to Kuala Lumpur.
The intention of this upload may have been to assist MH370 to return to Kuala Lumpur. Unfortunately, the initiative was unsuccessful.
Ground-to-air telephony call placed from a number with country code 60 (Malaysia)
- Q10 AOC Priority Level.
- The Perth GES logs indicate that a good link is likely to have existed at this time.
- This call would have been routed to the cockpit and should have resulted in a chime and an incoming visual annunciation on the Audio Control Panels, and, if the appropriate SATCOM page was selected, then also on one or more MCDU.
- The GES logs show zero duration, indicating that the call went unanswered. Note that there are two methods for the answering of an incoming call: Either by pressing the relevant Line Select Key on an MCDU, or by keying a microphone.
The GES logs show that the unanswered Ground to Air telephony call was cleared by the calling party.
Malaysia Airlines released a brief Media Statement at 07:24 MYT, in English and Mandarin. This was the first official notification to the media that an incident had occurred. The words lost contact were chosen carefully:-
Malaysia Airlines confirms that flight MH370 has lost contact with Subang Air Traffic Control at 2.40am, today (8 March 2014).
The stated time (2:40 am) likely refers to when MAS ODC attempted to contact MH370 by sending a test message which failed.
SATCOM Log-On, initiated from the aircraft terminal. This is the seventh ‘handshake’.
- For there to have been a Log-On at this time, there must have been a prior loss of the SATCOM link. This link loss must have occurred at some time after 0010:58, when the SATCOM responded to a Log-On interrogation.
- This Log-On request suggests that whatever caused the SATCOM link loss to occur had been reversed.
Maritime Operations Centre Notified
Malaysia Airlines released the second Media Statement at 09:05 MYT.
Additional information included the number of passengers (239 including 2 infants), 13 different nationalities, and 12 crew.
Singapore Aircraft Deployed
Malaysian Aircraft Deployed
At 1130 MYT on Saturday 8 March 2014 a Bombardier CL415 from the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) took off and headed to the search area.
Other Notifications
Information was also passed to Oil Rig Operators based in the Kota Bharu, Terengganu and Kerteh, on the East coast of Peninsular Malaysia for any possible sighting or reports. This information was also given to helicopters that operate in and out to the oil rig area.
Information was also passed to the Malaysian Control Centre (MCC) for possible reports to police stations (SAR point of contact) throughout the country. The first air SRU to be deployed was RESCUE 101, a Bombardier CL415 from the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). A vessel, KM AMANAH also from the MMEA, was redirected to the Last Known Position (LKP) of MH370 to conduct a search.
Source: MH370 Search and Rescue Operations and Lesson Learnt
Joint Investigation Team Convened
Joint Investigation Team (JIT) based in Malaysia comprising experts and specialist from Malaysia, China, USA, UK and France, and other senior government and academic sources.
Source: MH370 Search and Rescue Operations and Lesson Learnt
The JIT subsequently provided technical advice which informed the selection of search areas.
KL-ARCC Informed of Possible Air Turn-back
The KL ARCC was informed by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) of a possible Air Turn Back by MH370 on 8 March 2014, at 10:30pm (1430 UTC). The RMAF also mentioned that the area towards the West of Peninsular Malaysia was the last known position observed on the military radar. At this stage, the KL ARCC was unable to determine whether MH370 did indeed make an air turn back, and it required further analysis and verification. Despite the uncertainties surrounding the ‘latest’ information received, it was decided that both areas to the East and West of Peninsular Malaysia would be searched, and a large number of assets, aircraft and vessels were deployed to search these areas.
At 2:30 pm (14:30 MYT) Malaysia Airlines released an incident update which confirmed that the company had no information on the location of the aircraft.
Malaysia Airlines also stated that the company was calling family members of passengers.
At 4:20 pm (16:20 MYT) Malaysia Airlines released a 4th Media Statement. The last known position of the aircraft was stated but the time quoted (2:40 am) does not match that position.
The airline addressed the many unvalidated reports out there in the media urging the media and the public to only report official statements from Malaysia Airlines and the Government of Malaysia.
Although 14 nationalities were listed, the airline had apparently confused the country codes of Indonesia (IDN) and India (IND).
At 19:20 MYT Malaysia Airlines released a 5th Media Statement and produced the first Passenger Manifest which included the names of the 12 Crew.
In what may have been the only official statement about the search for MH370, Malaysia Airlines confirmed that an international search commenced that morning, nothing was found, and although the sea mission would continue, the air mission would recommence at daylight.
The was the final Media Statement on Saturday 8 March 2014.
Malaysia Airlines focus was on the families of passengers and crew. However, although Malaysia Airlines was supportive it was beyond their capability.
The Government of Malaysia formed a High Level Team, but even that was overwhelmed by the negative responses in China. The Government Team, led Hishammuddin Hussein, Minister of Defence and Acting Minister of Transport took over the daily Briefings.
A summary of actions taken by Malaysia Airlines in response to the loss of MH370 is listed below:-
- attempted to contact next of kin before releasing passenger manifest
- engaged a disaster recovery management specialist from Atlanta, USA
- deployed a team of 94 caregivers consisting of well-trained staff and also Tzu Chi Foundation
- sent a team to Beijing
- established a Family Communication and Support Centre (FCSC) in Beijing and six other provinces in China. These were closed on 28 April 2015.
- commenced financial assistance
- set up operations centres in both Kuala Lumpur and Beijing, to care for the families of the crew members and passengers. "MAS has allocated each family a caregiver, who will be on 24hours duty. They have sent more than 100 staff and caregivers to Beijing. The airline gives daily briefings to the families. They provide counselling sessions. And they contact families that have elected not to come to Malaysia between two and three times a day."
For a continuation of Malaysia Airlines news please refer to the Media Statements from Sunday 09 March 2014 onwards.