Safety Investigation Report 2018:3 Findings and Conclusion/3.1 Findings/3.1.4

Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018

Table of Contents

This page contains an extract from the Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018 and Appendices released by The Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, and dated 2 July 2018.

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT
MH370 (9M-MRO)

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3.1.4 Airworthiness & Maintenance and Aircraft Systems

• 1) The maintenance records indicated that the aircraft was equipped and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures, except for the instance of the Solid-state Flight Data Recorder Underwater Locating Beacon (SSFDR ULB) battery which had expired in December 2012.


• 2) The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness.


• 3) The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight.


• 4) The mass and the centre of gravity of the aircraft were within the prescribed limits.


• 5) Although it cannot be conclusively ruled out that an aircraft or system malfunction was a cause, based on the limited evidence available, it is more likely that the loss of communication (VHF and HF communications, ACARS, SATCOM and Transponder) prior to the diversion is due to the systems being manually turned off or power interrupted to them or additionally in the case of VHF and HF, not used, whether with intent or otherwise.


• 6) The recorded changes in the aircraft flight path following waypoint IGARI, heading back across Peninsular Malaysia, turning south of Penang to the north-west and a subsequent turn towards the Southern Indian Ocean are difficult to attribute to any specific aircraft system failures. It is more likely that such manoeuvres are due to the systems being manipulated.


• 7) The SATCOM data indicated that the aircraft was airborne for more than 7 hours suggesting that the autopilot was probably functioning, at least in the basic modes, for the aircraft to be flown for such a long duration. This in turn suggests that the air and inertial data were probably available to the autopilot system and/or the crew.


• 8) The inter-dependency of operation of the various aircraft systems suggests that significant parts of the aircraft electrical power system were likely to be functioning throughout the flight.


• 9) Without the benefit of the examination of the aircraft wreckage and recorded flight data information, the investigation is unable to determine any plausible aircraft or systems failure mode that would lead to the observed systems deactivation, diversion from the filed flight plan route and the subsequent flight path taken by the aircraft.


• 10) No Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal from the aircraft was reported by the responsible Search and Rescue agencies or any other aircraft.

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Disclaimer

Source:  Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, 02 July 2018, Safety Investigation Report MH370/01/2018 SIR-2018 ‎

Underwater Locator Beacon. A device attached to aviation flight recorders that when immersed in water emits an acoustic signal, to assist with locating an aircraft’s Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder. (Source: ATSB)

Very High Frequency

High Frequency

Aircraft Communication and Reporting System

Satellite Communications

A device that emits an identifying signal in response to an interrogating received signal from a communications satellite or ground station. (Source: ATSB)

A predetermined geographical position that is defined in terms of latitude and longitude coordinates, used for navigation. More Info

Waypoint Country SG Latitude 6° 56' 10.00" N Longitude 103° 35' 6.00" E More Info

An aircraft is considered airborne when all parts of the aircraft are off the ground. (Source: FAA)

Emergency Locator Transmitter